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Why the Rule of Law?
Richard K Greenstein*
[W]e as judges must decide this case on the law.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Why should we care about the rule of law? The rule of law2 is
enjoying a resurgence in the public consciousness. As the various
constituents of the former Soviet Union seek membership in the
European Union and as the People's Republic of China seeks
greater integration in the world economy, the willingness of these
nations to publicly commit to the ideals of the rule of law has
assumed the status of a near prerequisite for their success.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court invoked constitutional
and statutory law to effectively constrain the war-making power of
the President of the United States.3 At the same time, other high-
profile decisions of American courts were seen by many as
"legislating" by creating new rights in the absence of explicit
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Temple University. I wish to thank Charles
Crampton, John Hasnas, and Dave Hoffman for their perceptive thoughts in
response to earlier versions of this article. I especially want to express my
gratitude to Jane Baron, who patiently, carefully, and insightfully read and
commented on multiple drafts.
1. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11 th Cir.
2005).
2. This article will raise a number of questions about the idea of the rule of
law. However, at this point I am using the phrase in the following sense: A
community operates under the rule of law if (1) the community claims a
monopoly on the use of force to resolve disputes and to protect the community's
health and welfare; (2) the coercion is deployed in accordance with rules or
principles that are publicly promulgated; and (3) the coercion in accordance with
these rules or principles applies to all members of the community, including
those who are responsible for exercising the coercive power on the community's
behalf
3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (citizen has
due process right to judicially challenge basis of detention as an "enemy
combatant"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (foreign
nationals captured abroad and held in military custody have federal statutory
habeas corpus right to challenge incarceration).
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textual authorization4 or as destabilizing legal doctrine by
overruling recent precedent5 and injecting personal values or
political allegiances into adjudication.6  Consequently, these
decisions have raised questions about the current vitality of the rule
of law.7 And, of course, Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo8 has
ignited a furious debate about the rule of law that has involved all
branches of state and federal government and has spilled into the
public forum. Moreover, all this renewed interest in the rule of law
has stimulated significant academic discourse on the topic, tpified
by Brian Tamanaha's recent publication On the Rule of Law.
All of these developments beg a fundamental question: Why
should we, or, in general, any community, care about the rule of
law? There is, of course, a traditional answer: The rule of law
protects a community against tyranny.'0 That is, law sets limits on
the use of governmental power. Law does this in two ways: by
requiring the government to act in accordance with preexisting
rules, principles, and standards, and by incorporating into those
standards supralegal norms" that reflect the polity's understanding
4. For example, the right of same-sex couples to marry. Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
5. For example, the United States Supreme Court's overruling of Bowers
v. Hardwick's ruling that the enforcement of state sodomy statutes against
homosexual conduct is constitutional. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123
S.Ct. 2472 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986).
6. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, which
effectively enabled George W. Bush to receive the crucial Florida electoral votes
in the 2000 presidential election. 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 2488, 123 S. Ct. at 561 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
8. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
9. Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory
(2004).
10. See id. at 139. There is another familiar answer: The rule of law
protects an array of individual rights against government intrusion. Thisjustification, characteristic of Western liberal democracies, is for that very
reason a controversial answer, for it depends heavily on particular cultural
values that are not universally shared-most especially, are not shared by
nonliberal polities that have nonetheless embraced the rule of law. As
Tamanaha persuasively argues, protection against tyranny is probably as close
as we have come to a universally appealing justification for the rule of law. Id.
at 137-39.
11. Examples of supralegal norms include natural, divine and customary
norms.
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of unalterable (or very hard to alter) limitations on the government
power.
Of course, for the rule of law to protect against tyranny, law
must be knowable. That is, law's limits must be sufficiently
specified so that they are known in advance of the state's use of
coercive power. This requirement of knowability focuses us on the
profound paradox of law. On the one hand, law is rule-like. Our
everyday experience is that law is relatively clear, enabling us,
including government officials, to reliably know what the law
permits, forbids, and requires. 12  On the other hand, law is
incorrigibly malleable, open-textured, and indeterminate, the very
quality that enables lawyers to advocate different legal positions,
judges to concur and dissent in specific cases, and courts to justify
distinguishing, limiting, and overruling precedent.
An important debate within twentieth-century jurisprudence
sought resolution of this paradox. Typically, legal theorists
privileged one or the other of law's facets. Fans of law's rule-like
quality asserted, for example, that indeterminacy is limited to a
proportionately small subset of "hard" cases,' 3 while proponents of
law's indeterminacy argued that the predictability of law is a
function of external stabilizing forces, variously identified as
convention, ideology, morality, norms, or structure,' 4 which shape
the way we understand cultural meaning, including the meaning of
legal doctrine.
Not surprisingly, the century ended with the debate at a
standoff, for it seems likely that law's two faces are real, but
irreconcilable.15 My concern, however, is not to resolve the issue,
but to think about what it implies for justifying the rule of law.
The protection-against-tyranny rationale speaks to one aspect of
law's character: its "ruleness," i.e., law's manifest ability to say in
advance what is permitted, forbidden, and required. But what
justifies the rule of law in light of law's malleability, open texture,
and indeterminacy, i.e., law's manifest inability to say what is
permitted, forbidden, and requires? Perhaps more to the point, just
what does the rule of law mean in light of law's malleability, open
texture, and indeterminacy?
12. We know, for example, that the law normally requires us to come to a
full stop at a red traffic light. We go through each day successfully relying on a
myriad of such legal provisions.
13. E.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-44 (1961).
14. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
15. Phenomena exhibiting irreconcilable qualities occur in other contexts.
For example, light can be accurately described both as consisting of discrete
particles and as a continuous wave.
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This essay is about making sense of and justifying the rule of
law when we think about law as indeterminate and, therefore,
unable to specify the limits on governmental power that protect us
from tyranny. In order to do this, it is first necessary to be clear
about just why law is indeterminate. Social interactions, including,
but not limited to disputes, invoke the multiple, heterogeneous
values held by various individuals and groups in a pluralistic
society. 16 Law, which mediates social interactions, reflects those
distinct values. That is, multiple, heterogeneous values are buried
within all legal doctrine. 17 These values have to do variously with
matters of social policy, with the purposes of particular legal
doctrines and particular legislative provisions, with the purposes of
law itself, with the institutional allocation of coercive power
among governmental branches and subdivisions, and so forth.' 8
An ordinary zoning case from the 1950's, Pierro v.
Baxendale,19 provides an illustration. In that case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey was called upon to decide whether a zoning
ordinance, which explicitly permitted rooming and boarding
houses in a certain zoning district, thereby permitted the
construction of a motel. To reach its ultimate ruling that the
ordinance prohibited motels within the district, the court threaded
its way through multiple constellations of values.
One set of value choices at stake in this case concerned
interpretation. Literally construed, the ordinance defined permitted
16. For example, the decision whether to comply with the request for
money from a stranger on the street raises a host of conflicting social and
political values about benevolence, encouraging self-reliance, empowering those
arguably dispossessed by the regnant economic and political system, an asserted
right to be left alone, and so forth. Disputes are sometimes about different
understandings of the facts, but can also be about conflicting values. Abortion,
gay rights, and the progressive income tax are some especially familiar
examples.
17. This idea developed through the example of the cases developing the
due process limitations on judicial assertions of personal jurisdiction in Richard
K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction
Paradigm, 387 Hastings L.J. 855 (1987).
18. For examples of the interaction between multiple doctrinal values and
different approaches to the ranking of these values (approaches which
themselves reflect different values), see Richard K. Greenstein, The Three Faces
of ORPP: Value Clashes in the Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 95 (1993).
19. 118 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1955). For a similar, but differently focused,
discussion of Pierro, see Jane B. Baron and Richard K. Greenstein,
Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility, 15 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 37, 69-73 (2001).
[Vol. 66
THE RULE OF LA W
rooming and boarding houses in a manner that seemed to include
motels.' But, should the words of the zoning ordinance be given
their literal meaning or a meaning determined by an assessment of
the meaning intended by the legislators or a meaning driven by a
determination of the provision's purpose? Reading an ordinance in
terms of its literal meaning values the notice function of law by
helping to ensure that ordinary persons subject to the law's
command will understand from the literal meaning of the
legislative language just what the law permits, requires, or forbids.
By contrast, interpreting an ordinance in terms of legislative intent
serves the political value of deference to the will of elective
representatives. If the will of the legislators as expressed in the
ordinance is accurately discerned and obeyed,2 even when
inconsistent with the ordinance's literal meaning, then the locus of
power resides in the electoral process where the judgment of the
legislature and of individual legislators is approved or rejected
through the popular vote. Finally, construing an ordinance to
effectuate particular purposes or policies values legislation as a
tool for social engineering. Statutes and ordinances exist to realize
identifiable objectives, and legislative language should therefore be
interpreted to achieve those objectives, even if such a reading is
inconsistent with the literal meaning of the language or the
particular understanding of that language by the enacting
legislators.
22
A second set of values in play in Pierro concerned the
objectives of New Jersey zoning legislation in general. One
purpose was to limit land use in order to preserve a particular
quality of life; 23 a second was to bring order to the use of land
20. "The ordinance defined a boarding house as 'any dwelling in which
more than six persons not related to the owner or occupant by blood or marriage
are lodged and boarded for compensation'; it defined a rooming house as 'any
dwelling where furnished rooms are rented to more than six persons for
compensation, provided however, the lodging of relatives, by blood or marriage,
of the owner or occupant of such dwelling shall not come within these terms."'
Pierro, 118 A.2d at 402.
21. The problems, both conceptual and practical, with the notion of
legislative intent have long been recognized. For a useful survey of several of
these difficulties see Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 Yale L.J.
754(1965).
22. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-62,
12 S. Ct. 511, 511-13 (1892).
23. SeePierro, 118 A.2d at408.
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within a community; 24 and a third, to respect and protect the
autonomous use of private property.
2
Yet other collections of values loom over virtually every case.
Some of these can be termed "institutional" and concern such
matters as the role of courts vis-6-vis other branches of
government, the hierarchical arrangement of courts, and the
relationship between state and federal courts. Others can be called
"jurisprudential." These values concern such matters as respect for
precedent, which implicates the utility of stability, consistency, and
predictability in the law; justice, one understanding of which
argues for departure from precedent when prior decisions are
thought to have been poorly reasoned; and the importance of law's
adaptability, which argues for departure from precedent when
changing social circumstances favor revisiting rulings from an
earlier era.
Thus, the meaning of the Pierro decision can be cast in terms
of a variety of values: substantive values having to do with
zoning, interpretive values having to do with what makes
legislation important, institutional values having to do with
authority and efficiency, and jurisprudential values having to do
with stability, justice, and adaptability. This collection of values
constitutes the matrix for Pierro as an expression of legal doctrine.
But even these observations fail to capture the full messiness
and potential ambiguity of Pierro's legal dimension. Consider the
entire group of values identified thus far as the matrix for the case.
Why are these the relevant values? What determines the meaning
of these values? Do these values have a ranking with respect to
one another and, if so, is this ranking fixed, or does it vary from
case to case?26 If they vary from case to case, what determines
their relative weight?
It is this multiplicity of values and the ambiguities regarding
their meanings and rank that enabled lawyers to make opposing
arguments in the Pierro case. Accordingly, the decision in Pierro
was dependent on which of these multiple and heterogeneous
values were given priority by the court, and this, in turn, largely
accounted for the dissenting opinion in the case. Moreover,
because these values persist, they do not vanish simply because a
24. See id at 409 (Hether, J., dissenting).
25. Seeid at409-10.
26. We might, for example, expect the values animating the doctrine of
stare decisis to be consistently ranked highly; on the other hand, we might
expect the substantive debate about zoning values to swing back and forth over
time. For an extended treatment of the ranking of doctrinal values, see
Greenstein, supra note 18.
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decision has been made; they enable lawyers to subsequently argue
for different interpretations of Pierro as precedent.
Recall that the point of this Pierro digression is to remind us
that while law can be perceived as rule-like, it does not have to be.
Law can also be accurately described as malleable, open-textured,
and indeterminate precisely because legal doctrines, generally, and
their application to concrete cases, specifically, embrace multiple
and heterogeneous values that can drive decisions in different
directions. Moreover, this can be demonstrated to be the case not
only in what we normally think of as "hard cases," but in all
cases.
27
The question, then, is what can the rule of law mean when law
is understood in this way? On one level, this question is simply
practical. Again, the rule of law seems to require that law be
knowable, i.e., that law's meaning be more or less transparent and
its applications more or less predictable, so that anyone can consult
the law both to determine what the law permits, prohibits, or
requires, and to identify the limits, such as constitutional limits, on
the coercive use of law. But how is knowability possible when law
is seen as indeterminate?
The answer to this practical question is well known and merely
requires that we identify the forces that, in fact, stabilize the
meaning of law without at the same time denying its malleable and
indeterminate quality. After all, our everyday experience of the
law is not one of malleability and indeterminacy; instead, we
experience the law as relatively stable and predictable, and thus
knowable, in very much the manner required by the rule of law
idea. Such experiences suggest that officials, in fact, feel
significantly constrained in answering the many value questions
before them when deciding a case. What generates this sense of
constraint? What gives the matrix of law shape and a stable
structure?
27. Indeed, a close examination of any application of legal doctrine will
reveal the same thing: a multiplicity of heterogeneous values. If we imagined
an utterly homogeneous society, in which all members valued the same things in
the same way, this would not be the case. Consequently, in such a
homogeneous society legal doctrine would not be necessary (although legal
process would be), for when all members value the same things, custom should
suffice for transmitting a stable understanding of what is permitted, required,
and forbidden. Disputes in such a society will be generated by disagreement
over facts or by someone's failure to do what everyone, including the actor,
understands to be the right thing. In short, legal doctrine is needed as a tool for
dealing with heterogeneity, and its protean quality is a product of that function.
2005]
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One answer has been offered in different forms by Marxists, 28
liberals, 29 and, most recently, critical theorists. 30 The basic idea is
that our culture is pervaded by what is variously called
"convention," "ideology," "morality," "norms," or "structure,"
which shapes the way we understand cultural meaning. What this
tells us with regard to law is that, while legal doctrine encompasses
multiple, heterogeneous values, widely-shared ideology tends to
stabilize the set of values at play in any particular doctrinal field, to
stabilize the relative ranking of those values when they clash on a
particular question, and to stabilize our understanding of the
meaning of those values when applied to concrete cases.
It bears emphasizing that the existence of this stabilizing
ideology does not contradict the heterogeneity of values within
doctrine. Rather, consensus or a dominant view about values
represents a snapshot of the current understanding and ordering of
these values at the current moment.31 Values appear and fade from
view, change their meanings, and ascend and descend in relative
strength, often slowly, and sometimes dramatically. 32 Moreover,
the fact that a particular set of values, rank, and meaning
28. See, e.g., Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 195-
96, 246-47 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith eds. trans., 1971).
29. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique
183-84 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and their
Critics, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 641, 646-52 (David
Kairys ed., Basic Books 3d ed. 1998); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 1133, (1991).
31. For example, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), reflects an era when
territorialist thinking dominated the understanding of the constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction. By 1945, notions of "fair play and substantial justice" had
come to dominate that understanding. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
32. For example, see the adoption by the California Supreme Court of a
theory of manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by an unreasonably
dangerous drug without a showing of causation in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (1980). There are many variations of these dramatic
changes in the law. Sometimes the groundwork was carefully laid for an
overthrow of the prevailing doctrine, as in the case of the rejection in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954), of the separate-but-
equal principle first announced aver half a century earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Sometimes a court simply changes its mind within a brief
period of time, as in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct.
1178 (1943) (finding mandatory recitation of pledge to the flag by school
children unconstitutional). For an empirical testing of three different models of
doctrinal change in the context of statutory interpretation, see Daniel A. Farber,
Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of
the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 848 (2005).
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represented by the "snapshot" will tend to dominate at a given time
does not mean that it will not be contested.
It is also important to emphasize that the stability discussed
here is not one that strictly determines the outcomes in new cases.
The stability created by ideology restricts the range of
considerations apparently available to decision makers. It tells us,
for example, that when making a zoning decision, officials may
consider the impact of the decision on the quality of community
life and on the free use of private property, but they should not
consider the ethnicity of the applicant.
A second answer to the question of what stabilizes the meaning
and application of law has to do with a set of institutional
structures in place that is designed to channel the interpretation and
application of legal doctrine toward the conventional
understandings shaped by ideology. These institutions are
characterized by hierarchy. For example, within every judicial
system in the United States, courts are arranged in a pyramid in
two different, but interlocking ways. The hierarchical structure of
these courts has a multitude of trial courts at its base. At various
levels of appellate review, the number of courts diminishes,
funneling cases into a single court at the top with ultimate
authority. One effect of this structure is to progressively reduce
the number of institutional bodies, with their varying perspectives,
that are involved in shaping legal doctrine for the jurisdiction.
Because of the power arrangement of these courts, this effect exists
even though a relatively small percentage of cases actually reach
the highest court.
Superimposed on this structure is a second, inverted pyramid.
Trials are conducted by a single judge. But the number of judges
considering a case tends to increase as it moves higher through the
appellate structure, and supreme courts universally consist of a
substantial number of judges. The need for the highest court to
reach decisions as a group tends to move decisions toward a
predictable middle ground either as a result of compromise among
the judges or by relegating judges with extreme views to an
outlying dissenting role.
Yet another stabilizing institutional hierarchy exists among
different types of law, a relationship derived from both the United
States Constitution and tradition. Along one dimension,
constitutions trump legislation, which trumps administrative
regulations and the common law. Along another dimension,
federal law is superior to state law, which is, in turn, superior to
local law. This trumping relationship substantially reduces the
2005]
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uncertainty that might otherwise be caused by clashes among
laws."
Finally, a third answer to the question of law's source of
stability needs special attention, and that is the inclusion within
ideology of norms designed specifically to stabilize law by giving
presumptive authority to past legal decisions. A number of them
have already been mentioned. They include doctrines that are
designed to limit reconsideration of previously decided issues,
such as the doctrines of stare decisis and resjudicata.34 They also
include institutional norms that give presumptive authority to the
past decisions of particular bodies, for example, the doctrine of
judicial review, 35 which gives courts the final say as to the
meaning and validity of legislation, and of legislative supremacy,
which ties the meaning of legislation to the intentions of the
legislative body and to the particular textual formulation of that
body, as is required, for instance, by the "plain meaning rule."
36
While these stabilizing norms are themselves subject to multiple
and sometimes inconsistent meanings and sometimes clash with
one another, their overall effect is to encourage interpretive
consistency between the past and present.
Based on the foregoing we can distinguish between easy and
hard cases. If it is true that all disputes encapsulate multiple,
heterogeneous values, but that the range and understanding of
these values is drastically constricted by ideology, institutional
structures, and stabilizing norms, then an easy case is one in which
experience enables us to confidently predict that the court will
identify and understand all the values in such a way that they point
to the same outcome or to confidently predict that the court will
rank clashing values in a particular way that points to a specific
outcome. Conversely, a hard case is one in which experience
33. It should be noted, however, that there is no such generally applicable
hierarchical relationship among conflicting laws promulgated by different states.
34. Another such norm is the "law of the case" principle, which limits the
relitigation at a later stage of a case of issues authoritatively resolved at an
earlier stage. See, e.g., Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (1915).
35. Of course, the fountainhead of judicial review in American law is
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Compare Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59,
12 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1892) (legislative will expressed through the "spirit" of the
statute), affirming United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1888) (legislative will expressed through plain meaning of statutory
language), with Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490, 37 S. Ct. 192,
196 (1917) (legislative intent expressed through plain meaning of statutory
language).
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enables us to confidently predict that the court will understand the
proper application of the competing values to be up for grabs, this
because the culture remains divided over their identity, relative
ranking, meaning, or application and because the division has not
been authoritatively resolved within the hierarchical structure of
the courts.3 7 Pierro was, in this sense, a hard case. The values at
stake pulled the decision in different directions, as reflected in the
majority and dissenting opinions.
Something important is missing from this account of law's
stability. Neither ideology nor moderating institutional structures
nor stabilizing norms can effectively fix the meaning of legal
doctrine unless officials are, as a general matter, committed to
consistency with the past. This commitment is perhaps the most
fundamental of the stabilizing factors, for unless officials care
about precedent, unless they care about the decisions of particular
institutions, unless they care about reflecting any societal
consensus that has developed over time and has informed those
prior decisions, these artifacts of the past will exert little influence
on the decision to be made in the present. Hence, in some very
important way, the rule of law depends upon this commitment. 38
Put another way, the rule of law reflects the presumptive
authority of past legal acts, whether it be the enactment of statutes
or the deciding of cases or the promulgation of regulations or the
interpretation of those acts by various officials, but past legal acts
have authority only if those subject to them recognize them as
37. Abortion cases, perhaps, exemplify such a set of values. Of course,
even legally hard cases in the sense just discussed may be predictable. Such
cases will often turn on the particular predilections of one or more judges. To
the extent these preferences are consistent and knowable, an attorney, for
example, can by careful research discover them and consequently predict with
accuracy what kinds of arguments will persuade the particular judge or judges in
question.
38. Nor is it just judges whose decisions reflect the commitment to which I
am referring. When the United States Supreme Court ordered President Nixon
to turn over the Wategate tapes, which ultimately implicated him in criminal and
potentially impeachable wrongdoing, he complied; he turned over the tapes.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). But why? It might
be because he was afraid-afraid that other forces in the government (the
military, perhaps) would turn against him, afraid that he would be harshly
judged by the public or by history. But one sensed that Nixon turned over the
tapes in significant part because, notwithstanding his apparently lawless actions,
as an official he did, in some important way, respect the law, and specifically
that his conduct displayed an important level of commitment of the Executive to
respecting the decisions of courts.
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having authority. In short, authority is a quality that is bestowed
on the decisions of the past. However, this commitment to
bestowing authority on the decisions of the past is a contingent
matter. There are many judicial decisions that depart from stare
decisis; 39 some Southern governors refused to respect the United
States Supreme Court's rulings mandating integrated public
education; 0 trial judges occasionally reject the binding status of
decisions by higher courts;41 and appellate courts sometimes issue
rulings that fail to reflect an existing social consensus.42 To a fan
of the rule of law, these actions may seem the work of rogue
officials.43 But it is important to see that each may, in fact, be
highly principled; each may reflect a decision on the part of
officials that there are values at stake, indeed, values within the law
that outweigh the values of consistency with the past.
Let me pause here to review the argument made thus far: For
the rule of law to make sense, law must be knowable. If we view
law not as a compendium of rules but as a malleable and
indeterminate doctrine, then for law to be knowable, the meaning
of legal doctrines must be stabilized, which is to say, the meaning
given to legal doctrine in the past must be stabilized. Not only is
this stability possible, but it is, in fact, our experience of law. I
have identified several factors that create this stability and have
suggested that the most crucial of these factors is a commitment,
especially on the part of officials, to bestow authority on decisions
of the past.
And so we have arrived at the normative question: Why
should we and, more specifically, officials commit to giving
special deference to these ideological, institutional, and stabilizing
norms? Particularly, why should we treat past legal decisions as
authoritative? In short, why should we care about the rule of law?
39. See cases cited supra note 32.
40. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958).
41. For example, a colleague of mine was present when a trial judge
forthrightly refused to apply decisions of the state appellate courts interpreting a
state consumer protection statute, calling them "immoral."
42. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954)
(ruling state segregation of public education unconstitutional); Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (ruling enforcement of state
sodomy statutes against homosexual conduct unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (ruling state criminalization of abortion
unconstitutional); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (ruling state prohibition of marriage by same-sex couples
unconstitutional).
43. See Balkin, supra note 30, at 1141.
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One answer, of course, is self-interest. There is usually lots of
personal benefit, for ordinary people and officials alike, in going
along with convention. For instance, a judge who ignores the
decisions of higher courts or the norm of stare decisis probably
should not expect to advance far in her career.
However, the rule of law might prove to be pretty fragile if its
force depends upon the sum of the individual calculations of
personal costs and benefits made by officials. The kind of
commitment needed to nourish the rule of law is a strong ethical
commitment.44 But what argument can be made for such a
commitment? I now turn to this question.
II. ARGUMENT
In this section, I offer an argument for the rule of law that is
very different from the protection-against-tyranny argument.
Specifically, I pursue the idea that it is important for communities
to engage in an ongoing project of self-definition and that the rule
of law is a valuable tool for that project. To develop this thesis
more clearly and precisely, I focus initially on the trial judge who
is considering whether to allow the Pierros to build their motel in
the district zoned to permit boarding and rooming houses. As
noted above, the relevant legal doctrine consists of multiple,
heterogeneous values that can justify different and inconsistent
results. The trial judge might, therefore, be tempted to start from
scratch; if the legal doctrine does not determine a particular result,
then the judge might decide for herself what the relevant values are
and what, all things considered, is the best resolution of the case.
Or the judge might be tempted to just flip a coin; if the legal
materials will justify different and inconsistent results, why, if only
for the sake of efficiency, should legal questions not be decided by
chance?
The expectation, however, is that the judge will take a different
tack-to reach an outcome consistent with past legal decisions.
Indeed, we take the judge to be obligated to respect those norms
that give presumptive weight to what has happened in the past and
forbid the judge from starting from scratch or flipping a coin. And
while what counts as a decision consistent with the past might
itself be debatable, these stabilizing norms will tend to limit and
direct the judge's decision-making in ways that make the outcome
more predictable than it would be if the judge did start from
44. Cf Hart, supra note 13, at 111-14 (the existence of a legal system
depends on officials' accepting an obligation to recognize and apply the
system's rules for legal validity).
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scratch and certainly more predictable than if the judge decided by
flipping a coin.
45
The focus is on the trial judge because, as we will see, the
argument for a commitment to continuity with the past applies with
special force to officials who frequently make legal decisions
without having to publicly state their reasons, officials such as trial
judges, bureaucrats, and police officers. Conversely, the argument
will turn out to apply with less force to officials who are expected
to publicly explain themselves-appellate judges, legislators, the
President, etc. This distinction accords with our expectation of a
less stringent adherence to the rule of law among this latter group
of officials.
46
The question, then, is why should a trial judge be committed to
following those norms that tie her present decisions to the
decisions of the past, a commitment which makes the rule of law
possible? There is an interesting answer to this question that does
not depend on a particular political philosophy. Rather, it has to do
with the importance of law as an expression of civic values and,
hence, as a tool for defining the community. To make this
particular case for commitment to the rule of law, let us leave the
legal realm temporarily and begin with an example of the kind of
difficult choices that an individual, rather than a community, might
face.
A. Decisions Made by the Flip of a Coin
My daughter is getting married on Saturday. She and her
fiance have largely taken responsibility for setting up the wedding,
which will be fairly traditional and large, with some guests coming
from long distances. She has asked me to walk her down the aisle,
and I have promised to do so.
It is Friday, the day before the wedding. Many of the out-of-
town guests have arrived. I receive a phone call from the mother
of a close friend, who was invited to my daughter's wedding. My
friend has been struck down by a sudden, acute, and fatal illness.
He is in a hospital a thousand miles away and is not expected to
live for more than a couple of days. He has asked to see me.
45. For a discussion of the relationship between rule-enforcement and
predictability see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 137-45
(1991).
46. For example, appellate judges, legislators, and the President are
expected to occasionally make new law, which trial judges, bureaucrats, and
police officers are not expected to do.
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What should I do? No doubt, some readers will find the
reasons for one course of action persuasive and will, therefore,
have a clear sense of what I ought to do. But I am torn. For me
the reasons, including powerful moral reasons, for attending and
participating in my daughter's wedding confront more or less
equally compelling reasons, including powerful moral reasons, for
rushing to the side of my friend a thousand miles away. So how do
I choose? I could struggle with the competing reasons and choose
whether to attend my daughter's wedding or my friend's death bed.
Suppose, however, I flip a coin.
Whatever you may think about the dilemma I face, you would,
I suspect, recoil from the idea of my flipping a coin. But why is
that? If the reasons for the different courses of action are well
balanced, then there is, perforce, no decisive reason for choosing
one course of action over the other. Deciding by a coin flip would,
therefore, seem to recommend itself on grounds of efficiency, if
nothing else. However, I think I would be expected to reject the
coin-flipping strategy for several considerations having to do with
character.
First of all, flipping a coin seems to deny significance in the
decision-making process to the reasons for the different courses of
action, and these reasons are, all would agree, important. It is true
that I arrive at the idea of flipping a coin only after I conclude that
the competing reasons are well-balanced, and that required taking
those reasons seriously. But, have I thereby taken those reasons
seriously enough?
In everyday life, of course, we do not make choices, even in
hard cases, by flipping a coin. And one reason, I think, is that it
feels like an abandonment of important principles. A decision has
to be made whether the competing considerations seem well-
balanced or not. Certainly, if the reasons are well balanced, they
cannot themselves determine the outcome, and so the potentially
endless struggle with those reasons has to stop so that we can get
on with our lives; so, that I can either attend my daughter's
wedding or rush to my friend's bedside. But to flip a coin is not
just to cease consideration of the competing reasons so that a
decision can be made; it is to abandon those reasons before the
decision is made and to decide instead by chance. And that seems
to deny the continuing importance of the reasons. If I take the
relevant reasons seriously enough, I should want to struggle with
them up to the bitter end, but I give up when I decide to flip a coin.
If I show myself to care so little about the competing values in the
hard case, can we be confident that I will take them seriously
enough in the easy case? In short, the giving up seems like a
failure of character.
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There is a second point about character. To me, the contending
reasons in my daughter-friend dilemma seem well-balanced. But
even if they were not, even if the justification for one course of
action felt clearly stronger than the other, my choice is an occasion
for remorse. For whatever I choose to do, I sacrifice something
important. And I should feel remorse. If I go to my friend's
bedside, my daughter, even if she approves of my decision, will be
justifiably disappointed and vice versa if I attend my daughter's
wedding. But if I flip a coin, I blunt my responsibility for the
decision,47 and, consequently, I blunt my acknowledgment of
responsibility for my daughter's or my friend's justified
disappointment, this acknowledgment of responsibility which is a
prime ingredient of remorse. I should not do that. Remorse in this
instance is crucial; through it I acknowledge and reaffirm my
caring for and my allegiance to the person, the relationship, and the
values that were sacrificed in this instance.
All this talk about character might suggest a preeminently
social concern: what kind of person I am for others. But my point
here is at least as much about what kind of person I am for myself.
Let me illustrate this idea with the story about how I acquired my
first dog. It all began when a stray had attached himself to a
friend, and she, in turn, urged me to "adopt" him. The dog and I
met at a social event at my friend's house, and we got along really
well. Still, I was unsure what to do. There seemed to be good
reasons for acquiring the dog and good reasons for remaining dog-
free. To resolve this impasse, I devised a simple test. The next
day I went to my friend's home, where the dog was sitting on the
lawn in front of her house, and I stood across the street and called
to the dog. I resolved that if the dog came to me, then that was a
"sign" that I was meant to take him in; if he did not come to me, I
would return home without him. So I called the dog. The dog sat
still, looking at me. I called again. The dog did not move. I called
a third time. Nothing. So I walked across the street, picked up the
dog, and took him home with me.
When I tell this story, a common interpretation, indeed, for a
long time, my interpretation, is that I really wanted the dog, and
that I had more or less deluded myself about the significance of the
"test." In this interpretation, my calling-the-dog strategy
functioned not as a decision-making procedure, but as a device for
focusing my mind and enabling me to clarify for myself what I
really wanted. Alternatively, in this interpretation, I could have
47. I am still responsible for the choice of the decision-making procedure,
but not directly for the decision itself.
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just as well flipped a coin to force myself to focus on what I really
wanted. Since under this interpretation my preference already
existed, no matter how the coin landed, I would have taken the
dog.
I now think that this interpretation is wrong. I do not believe
that I had within me an inchoate preference that became clear to
me by means of my silly test. Rather, I think that up to the very
end I had no determined preference and that the test was the final
step that enabled me to decide what I preferred.48
I could, of course, have left the matter to chance; I could have
simply flipped a coin and either taken or left the dog, depending on
how the coin landed. In the end, there was no uniquely correct
answer to the question of whether I should adopt the dog, and
random chance might be thought to be at least as effective a
determinant as my subjective preference. But we can easily see
that my preference was exactly what was important. Flipping a
coin would have given me an answer as to whether to take the dog,
but it would not have enabled me to decide what I preferred, and
that was what I needed to know. Whether I took the dog or not
mattered in my life at that time, and so deciding whether to take
the dog was deciding some small, but significant thing about how I
wanted to live my life. I wanted to take responsibility for how I
live my life, and so if I took the doF, I wanted to do so "for reasons
... that appear[ed] to [me] valid.' 4
The same, of course, is true of my decision regarding whether
to participate in my daughter's wedding or go to my dying friend's
bedside. If I struggle with this problem to the point of decision and
then choose to go to my friend, it will be for reasons, i.e., that he is
dying, that he has asked this one last thing of me, that my daughter
has a life ahead of her in which I will still be able to meaningfully
participate, that I love my friend, and that my daughter will
understand. If, instead, I struggle with this problem to the point of
decision and then choose to go to the wedding, it will also be for
reasons, i.e., that this is a unique day of surpassing importance in
my daughter's life, that I made a promise, that my relationship
with my friend is coming to an end while my relationship with my
daughter is ongoing and could be endangered by my absence, that I
love my daughter, and that my friend will understand.
When I decide, I am not making clear what I always "really"
wanted to do. I am not simply reasoning backwards from results
48. For example, see Hillary Putnam's discussion of "coming to see" how
one should act, in Hillary Putnam, On the Rationality of Preferences, in The
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays 79, 93-94 (2002).
49. Id. at 88.
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already reached, but perhaps only dimly perceived. The notion
that I have decided and decided for these reasons is neither
rationalization nor self-delusion. In other words, the decision I
reach is not a matter of retrospection; it is a step forward in
defining what kind of person I want to be. How much do I value
promises? How much do I value friendship? How much do I love
my daughter? How much do I love my friend? How
compassionate am I toward the dying?
In saying what kind of person I want to be, my concern is not
simply about who I am for others, i.e., for my daughter, my dying
friend, my family, and my neighbors. It is just as much about who
I am for myself. Do I understand myself to be someone who
leaves important matters to chance, the flip of a coin, or am I
someone who identifies decisions with important values?
The existential power of deciding for reasons, then, lies in this:
How I ultimately resolve the struggle, what I decide to do, to that
extent, defines who I am to myself and to others. When I decide
by flipping a coin, I deny that values are important to what I do,
that values matter in my life. When I decide for reasons, I say
what values are important to me and, by doing so, assert that my
life itself has value.
B. To Maintain Continuity or Break with the Past
If we say who we are by the choices we make and by how we
make those choices, then one of the fundamental decisions we
confront at times of choice is whether to redefine ourselves or
choose with an eye to maintaining continuity between who we
have been in the past and who we aspire to be in the future. Put
another way, I might try to make decisions, such as whether to
attend my daughter's wedding and whether to adopt a dog, by
starting from scratch, i.e., by taking into account all of the
competing considerations without preassigned weights. Or I might
think about the kinds of decisions I have made in the past and seek
to make a present decision that values personal consistency, i.e., a
decision that accords with the kind of person that those past
decisions show me to be.
On the one hand, there are good reasons for starting from
scratch without presumptions in the hopes of "getting it right."50
After all, my concern is not only to show proper respect for the
competing values at stake, but to show proper concern for
achieving a good outcome. On the other hand, there are good
50. See Schauer, supra note 45, at 135-37.
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reasons for acknowledging the importance of continuity with the
past. Some are practical reasons. For example, there is the simple
fact that I cannot fully free myself from the past. As noted before,
the pervasive, ideological character of culture shapes the ways in
which I understand the world and the possible choices I perceive at
each juncture. It makes little sense to think that I can somehow
step outside that matrix and truly start from scratch.5' Such a
thought can only be a type of self-deception that may well impair
my ability to critically and realistically assess the situation.
There is also the question of efficiency. "Reinventing the
wheel" ignores the lessons learned from successful past choices in
the face of competing values.
There are other, one might say, more existential, reasons for
giving special weight to making our decisions consistent with the
past. We are aware of ourselves as temporal, and something that
might seem important to our conception of ourselves is integrity in
the sense of our actions being integrated over time into a coherent,
stable self. Any need we might have to stabilize our own self-
conception of who we are will press us toward some degree of
consistency in our choices of how to act in the world.
However, beyond that, we are aware of ourselves as existing
for other people and of the importance of our being recognized by
others.52 Others recognize, judge us, and come to understand who
we are, through our actions. In most instances, we do not bother
or, perhaps, do not have an opportunity to explain ourselves. Yet
our actions can be both intelligible to others and communicate
something about our character. But just how do our actions
communicate who we are to others? Two sources of this
communicative effect of our actions seem especially important.
One source is the combination of experience and the
conventions that structure and stabilize social meaning. For
example, driving to work one morning, I see two cars stopped in
the middle .of the street. Each has visible damage. Two men are
standing in the street and appear to be engaged in conversation. I
cannot hear what is being said, but I conclude from their gestures
that there has been a collision, that the two men are the drivers, and
that they are angrily yelling at each other about the collision and
about who is at fault. Of course, there might be a different
explanation. The cars might have been left by others and these two
men might be friends who have just seen each other and are
51. See generally Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change,
Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989).
52. Cf Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology 220-430 (Hazel Barnes trans., 1956).
2005)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
excitedly planning an outing to a baseball game in the middle of
the street. But past experiences, including experiences with
cultural conventions of the body language through which we
express anger, lead me to confidently conclude that this is a livid
encounter over a car crash.
Sometimes, though, actions are ambiguous, but if we know the
actor, then we can interpret even ambiguous actions on the basis of
that knowledge. For example, when someone is late for a meeting,
that act of being late might signify rudeness or indifference or lack
of conscientiousness or inadvertence. If I know the person well, I
might be able to narrow down the meaning of the lateness. I might
know this person, for instance, to be polite, engaged, and
conscientious and therefore conclude that something unexpected
must have happened to make her late.
The point is not that we can fully determine how our actions
will be understood by others, just as an author cannot fully
determine how readers will interpret her texts. But insofar as I
wish to say intelligibly to myself and to others who I am, I must
take into account that the meaning of my actions is communicated
in significant part through a combination of social conventions and
others' knowledge of me as a specific person, which is to say,
knowledge of my specific past. Hence, in order to effectively
communicate my intentions and, more generally, my character, I
rely in large part on the way in which my actions reflect both
conventions and my past acts. And if, on the other hand, I intend
an action in something other than its conventional sense or insofar
as I act "out of character," I need to explain myself, both to others
and to myself, in order to make clear how my choice of action says
who I am.
C. Commitments as a Member of a Group
Saying who I am would be hard enough if I were just an
individual with individual commitments to various values,
attitudes, goals, and beliefs. But I am not just an individual; I am
deeply enmeshed in a vast array of relationships with individuals,53
groups,54  institutions, and larger, more impersonal
communities.56 In most of my life, I am we; so in most of my life,
saying who I am involves saying who we are, the identity of that
"we" constantly shifting, depending on which of my affiliations is
53. Such as my daughter and my friend.
54. Such as my family and my neighborhood.
55. Such as my workplace and my schools.
56. Such as my profession and my country.
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in focus. 57 And each of those "we's" is defined in significant part
by its own set of commitments to various values, attitudes, goals,
and beliefs.
58
There are several important features of my having
commitments as a member of a group. First of all, I can commit
myself in ways that are not included in, and possibly inconsistent
with, my individual commitments. For instance, as an individual, I
object to neo-Nazism and, specifically, to a planned march by a
neo-Nazi group through a predominantly Jewish section of my
town. In fact, I am sufficiently opposed to the march that I am
engaging in a variety of actions designed to stop the event,
including demonstrating outside of the organization's
headquarters.
However, it turns out that a lawsuit has been filed seeking an
injunction prohibiting the march, and I am a partner in a law firm
that has been approached by the neo-Nazis to represent them in
this suit. As an individual, I wish that my firm did not take the
case, and I might even actively oppose accepting these clients on
the ground that what the neo-Nazis wish to do is wrong. However,
if my firm does accept the case, while I certainly would not work
on it, I would, as a member of the firm, actively support providing
the clients with high-quality representation even as I oppose their
march. At the same time, that support might become a reason for
curtailing my individual acts of public opposition to the march.
Secondly, just as I might struggle with defining my individual
commitments, commitments can be contested within a group.
Within the firm, we might have a robust debate over whether we
should represent the neo-Nazis, a debate that may well implicate a
variety of important and distinct values for which the firm stands.
If the debate seems fundamental to the identity of the firm, it might
continue on some level even after the matter has been resolved
through some formal decision-making process. Thus, certain
members of the firm might continue to object if the neo-Nazis
were, in fact, accepted as clients. More positively, members of the
firm might properly argue that our counseling of these clients
should raise serious moral objections to their planned march.
A third interesting feature of having commitments as a member
of a group is that I expect other members of the group to act in
ways that express the commitments that define the group. Thus,
notwithstanding my own antipathy toward the neo-Nazis, I would
57. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1514-20
(2000).
58. See id at 1517.
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expect the actions of all members of the firm to reflect concern that
the client receive excellent legal representation. Accordingly, I
would object strongly to lackadaisical work by a lawyer assigned
to the case caused by the lawyer's animosity toward the neo-Nazis.
I might object as a professional; that is, I might regard as
unprofessional the lawyer's letting his personal feelings undermine
his commitment to the client. This sense of professionalism, of
what kind of behavior is expected of lawyers, is likely shaped in
significant part by conventions, conventions within the community
of lawyers and conventions within the larger society.
Moreover, I might object to the lawyer's carelessness because I
regard his actions as inappropriate for a member of the group to
which I belong, that is, as part of a law firm that is committed to
certain attitudes and values. These expectations will be shaped in
significant part by the past conduct of the firm; I will expect
members of the firm to act "in character" by reflecting the firm's
attitudes and values, which have become my attitudes and values
insofar as I am a member of the firm and, therefore, are part of
what defines who I am. Accordingly, I might regard actions
inconsistent with those attitudes and values to reflect badly on the
firm and, by extension, on me. As an individual with individual
commitments, only my own inappropriate actions can reflect badly
on me. However, as a member of a group with group
commitments, the inappropriate actions of any member of the
group acting as a member of the group can reflect badly on me. As
a professional, I might be disappointed by the actions of the
lackadaisical lawyer; as a member of the firm, I might be
ashamed. 59
This latter feature connects to the earlier point about
contestable commitments in this way: I might have feelings such
as shame even if the commitment in question was in dispute.
Thus, I might feel ashamed if the firm accepts the neo-Nazis as
clients, even though the institution was divided over the
appropriateness of this action and the values and attitudes it
expresses, and even though I would, as noted above, be committed
to providing these clients excellent legal representation.
All these observations apply to a citizen's affiliation with the
nation. During the Vietnam War, for example, many citizens
protested the prosecution of that war by the American government.
In one sense, they objected to the war on moral and political
59. For a moral and political argument for group responsibility and
consequent feelings of shame see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 167-75
(1986).
[Vol. 66
THE RULE OF LA W
grounds that mirrored similar opposition around the world.6 ° In
another sense, American citizens' resistance to the war was unique
in its reflection of their anger and shame, for their government was
waging a war that, in their view, violated fundamental values to
which the American polity should be committed, values that did
not just happen to be the commitments of individual Americans,
but were subscribed to by many Americans in large part because of
social conventions, ideology, and past political and social acts
that contributed to defining what it means to be an American. 62 in
this latter sense, the war expressed values that its citizen-opponents
deemed inconsistent with what the country stood for and,
therefore, reflected badly on them as citizens.
63
Similarly, we can approve or criticize the enactment of a law,
such as a law criminalizing stem cell research using the tissue of
human embryos, on the ground that the values it expresses either
are or are not good values for American society to embrace. 64 As
with objections to the Vietnam War, this kind of approval or
criticism is internal, i.e., it is made by members of the group,
American society, as part of the ongoing enterprise of debating
what values the group should be committed to and should express
through its laws. From this perspective, approval is often
accompanied by some degree of pride, and criticism by some
degree of shame or embarrassment. This contrasts with external
approval or criticism of the law, which might be made by anyone,
anywhere and would not normally reflect emotions such as pride,
shame, or embarrassment.
65
Whether we are considering the treatment of the neo-Nazis or
the prosecution of a war or the enactment of a statute, the
expressive meaning of these actions is not necessarily congruent
with the intentions of the actor, just as the expressive meaning of
60. For example, some around the world, including some in the United
States had political sympathies with the aspirations of the North Vietnamese
leader Ho Chi Minh.
61. See Balkin, supra note 30.
62. Some, for instance, were morally affronted by the use of napalm by the
American military with its devastating effects on the civilian population.
63. For a more recent example, consider Governor Howard Dean's plea, "I
want my country back!" Howard Dean, Speech at Sacramento, California
(March 15, 2003), available at http://www.crocuta.net/Dean/Transcriptof
DeanSacramento Speech_ 15March2003.htm.
64. We can also criticize laws on the ground that they express our best
values inadequately. That is, our objection can be aimed at the mode of
expression, the values expressed, or both.
65. See Dworkin, supra note 59.
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my individual actions is not necessarily congruent with my own
intentions. Thus, the lackadaisical lawyer in my firm might not
actually intend to express dislike for the neo-Nazis; he might just
be careless.66 Nor might the prosecutors of the war understand
their conduct to express the values despised by the protesters.
In short, the expressive meaning of an act is its public meaning,
the meaning that best makes sense of the act from the point of view
of the observer. Just as an individual cannot reliably determine
how others will understand her acts, so the public meaning of a
group's acts may well be contestable. Individual observers might
disagree on how best to interpret the act in question and, therefore,
what values it expresses. But, as is the case for an individual actor,
for a group's acts to be publicly intelligible at all, one of two
situations will normally occur: Either the act must conform to
social conventions or the observer's knowledge of the group's past
acts, or the group must explain itself.
67
The common distinction between ministerial and discretionary
acts trades somewhat on these alternatives. Ministerial acts of,
say, an administrative agency are intelligible largely because they
strictly conform to convention and to past behavior. On the other
hand, discretionary acts, such as the decision to go to war, will be
intelligible if the decision conforms either to international
conventions about conducting war or with past behavior of this
particular government in question; otherwise, we expect an
explanation. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of governmental
acts that we encounter in our daily life seem to be ministerial, i.e.,
acts that we expect to conform both to past practice and to
conventions, including the norms that stabilize the meaning of
legal doctrine. That is, we expect our government to mostly act in
ways that are intelligible without special explanation, and the
commitment on the part of government officials to give preference
66. Or the dislike might be unconscious, or the lawyer might erroneously
believe he is successfully hiding his feelings.
67. For example, we would understand and not be surprised if the American
Civil Liberties Union opposed a proposed statute allowing suspected terrorists to
be held for an extended period of time without being formally charged. This
reaction would follow from our prior knowledge of the aims and activities of the
organization. Conversely, if the ACLU were to enthusiastically embrace the
proposed statute, we would likely be puzzled and need an explanation in order to
make sense of this position.
68. For example, when we apply for Social Security benefits, we expect the
bureaucrats in the Social Security Administration to process the application in a
manner consistent with how such applications have been processed in the past.
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to stabilizing norms, including those associated with the rule of
law, helps make this possible.
By contrast, the enactment of a statute often requires starting
from scratch, i.e., to be a product of all-things-considered
deliberation about policy that gives no presumptive weight to past
legislative decisions, except, of course, the Constitution.69
Consequently, legislative acts do not necessarily rely on
conventions or past behavior for intelligibility. And so we would
expect the statute criminalizing research using human embryos to
be accompanied by all manner of official and unofficial public
discussion, the effect of which would be to explain the point and
provide justification of the enactment in question.
D. The Public Meanings of Legal Decisions
Like the decision to prosecute a war or the vote to enact a
statute, the adjudication of an individual legal case has public
meaning. At the appellate level, since the public is not privy to the
intra-court deliberations leading to a decision, the public meaning
of that decision is almost necessarily a function of the opinion that
accompanies it. Thus, the public meaning of the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Pierro, holding that the motel could
be excluded from the zoning district in question, is largely shaped
by the majority opinion. And like the decision to prosecute a war
or to enact a statute, the values expressed by appellate court
decisions, being important public acts by a community of which
citizens are members, reflect on those citizen-members. Just as we
might feel pride or shame along with our approval or criticism of
the American government's prosecution of a particular war, so we
might feel pride or shame accompganying our evaluation of a
particular Supreme Court decision. The published opinions in
our great national cases are widely discussed among lawyers,
academics, and the general public in large part because we
understand that through the decisions of our judicial institutions we
define our public self in important ways. Brown v. Board of
Education and Bush v. Gore were not merely difficult cases to
decide, but each of these decisions makes a claim about the values
that the country is committed to and, therefore, about who we are;
claims that I, as a citizen, might accept as true or reject as wrong,
inapt, and untrue to who we really are.
69. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 112 (1977).
70. Think of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686
(1954) and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
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As was true of the public meaning of individual actions, the
public meaning of an appellate opinion is not necessarily
congruent with the actual intentions of the judges. Even if the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Pierro was based on the
judges' "personal values" and the rationale of their written opinion
constructed after the fact to obscure the true basis of that decision,
the public meaning of their decision may well be shaped by the
conventions invoked by the writing. But this is not necessarily the
case: If an appellate opinion fails to connect with recognized
conventions or if it seems unaccountably inconsistent with past
decisions of the court, the public meaning of the decision might
well be understood as a departure from law, a decision based not
on the values that are understood to be relevant to such legal
disputes, but on the individual preferences of the judges.7 1
At the trial level, while there is typically no published opinion
explaining the court's judgment, that judgment still has public
meaning. Consequently, the typical absence of a public
explanation reinforces the independence of the public meaning of a
trial judgment from the actual intentions of the judge. Thus, the
decision by the trial judge permitting the Pierro brothers to build
their motel has a public meaning.72 At the time, the community to
whom the decision was addressed might likely have understood its
public meaning as having to do with valuing the Pierros'
autonomous use of their own property, as well as with many of the
interpretive and jurisprudential values discussed earlier.73 And we
do not know whether this public meaning reflects the actual
intentions of the judge. That is, the judge might have been a
thoughtful and conscientious judge, who actually intended to
express particular preference among the relevant values; on the
other hand, he might have actually ruled in favor of the Pierro
brothers simply because he personally liked them. The public
meaning of the decision was independent of that in significant part
71. It is this understanding of the public meaning of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 121 S. Ct. 525, that accounts for the fact that many perceive it as an
illegitimate judicial usurpation of the political process for electing Presidents.
72. Of course, in many cases, the trial judgment will follow a jury's verdict.
The addition of a jury's deliberation alters the public meaning of a judgment in
ways that are ignored in the text.
73. My colleague Dave Hoffman points out that the means by which a court
ruling is communicated can affect its public meaning. If, for example, a ruling
is reported in the newspaper, not only does the reporter's interpretation of the
ruling help shape the public's understanding, but the very fact of the newspaper
account may lend additional weight to the ruling.
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because the judge's intentions remain private. 74 Indeed, the public
meaning of the decision would have been unaffected by the judge's
having decided by a private flip of a coin.
Here, again, we see the inappropriateness of resolving the
choice among competing doctrinal values by a coin flip. If the
public acts of our government officials, such as prosecuting a war,
enacting a statute, and deciding a case, have public meanings and
if these public meanings express values that, in turn, contribute to
the definition of who we are as a community, then we might want
those public acts to be the result of reasoning, of careful
consideration of just what meaning is going to be expressed, of
thoughtful reflection on just what is going to be said about who we
are. If the war or the legislation or the judicial decision is the
product of a coin flip, then we are defining ourselves through
chance, and this seems bizarre. It is as though I were to decide by
flipping a coin whether to be and to express the values of a
conventional law professor or to be and express the values of an
international terrorist. Or it is as though I were to decide by
flipping a coin whether to be and to express the values of the kind
of person who would miss his daughter's wedding to rush to the
bedside of a dying friend.
Of course, one solution to this problem of public meaning is to
institutionalize the coin flip. That is, judges could publicly
announce that they will decide by coin flip, at least in hard cases
when the arguments for different outcomes seem to the judge to be
well balanced. As a result, the public meaning of the decision
would change. It would no longer reflect an evaluation of the
merits or commitment to various interpretive or jurisprudential
principles because the outcome of the decision would be publicly
known to be random.
But now this act, i.e., this decision-making-by-coin-flip, has a
public meaning. That is, the judge says who we are as a
community not only by what she decides, but how she decides.
And what is that public meaning of decision by coin flip? It is the
very meaning that would attach to my decision to flip a coin to
resolve my daughter-friend dilemma, i.e., giving up by refusing to
continue to struggle with the competing values at stake in the case.
But if, as citizens, we take these values seriously because they are
74. However, even if the judge's intentions are public, they will not
necessarily determine the public meaning of the ruling. Thus, for example, in
the long run, the meaning of the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.
Ct. 525, is likely to be determined more by the relationship of the reasoning of
the majority opinion to precedents than by biographical facts about the political
preferences of the individual Justices.
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values to which we as a community are committed, we might want
our community officials, including the judge, to struggle up to the
bitter end.
Moreover, because values are in conflict, no matter what the
judge decides, some important values that we as a community
governed by law take to be important will be sacrificed. And
because these values are important constituents of who we are as a
community, their sacrifice would be an occasion for regret and
even remorse. Indeed, we should feel remorse whenever our
actions as a community sacrifice important values. But if the
judge, and we, through the judge, flip a coin, we blunt our
acknowledgment of responsibility for the decision,
acknowledgment that is a prime ingredient of remorse. And we
should not do that. Remorse in this instance is crucial; through it
we acknowledge and reaffirm our caring for and our allegiance to
the values to which we as a community are committed and those
we sacrificed in this instance.
But, of course, the coin flip is not the only, nor probably the
most appealing, option open to the judge who must make choices
among competing doctrinal values. More realistically, the judge
could try to start from scratch; she could try to make an all-things-
considered judgment about what values ought to be considered,
what those values mean, how they rank with each other, and how
they best apply to the instant case. For the fact that the multiple,
heterogeneous values constituting legal doctrine might support
different and inconsistent outcomes does not disable the judge's
judgment that some outcomes are more desirable than others.
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of my focus in this essay on the
malleability and contingency of legal doctrine is an insistence that
our very recognition of multiple possibilities frees decision
makers, i.e., judges, lawyers, bureaucrats, as well as legislators,
from the excuse of legal determinism and, accordingly, makes
them responsible for the choices they make and for the worlds they
consequently create. In other words, taking seriously the value
choices inherent in every case, whether hard or easy, does not
require giving any special privilege to the decisions of the past and
to the norms that stabilize legal meaning. Taking value choices
seriously does not require special commitment to those values that
support the rule of law.
However, if the judgments of courts, like all acts of public
officials, contribute publicly to defining who we are as a
community, how is this public meaning rendered intelligible? In
the case of trial courts, the absence of public explanation of their
judgments in the form of written decisions requires us to fall back
on conventions and past decisions in order to understand the
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meaning of a court's judgment. That is, there is good reason for
trial judges to commit themselves to the rule of law in order to
make the meaning of their acts understandable both to themselves
and to the public.
In the case of appellate courts, things are more complicated.
The hierarchical structure of our legal system requires trial judges
to follow the lead of decisions by courts higher in the system. If
the unexplained decisions of trial judges are intelligible largely
through the lens of conventions and past decisions, then appellate
courts must pay significant respect to that lens and produce
consistent and predictable decisions; otherwise, the judgments of
trial judges in accordance with the dictates of appellate courts will
lose their intelligibility.
But appellate courts also have another function. As I suggested
earlier, appellate decisions are a vehicle through which we debate
important questions of civic values. Hence, appellate courts have
the responsibility to reconsider what values are relevant to
different legal problems, what the values mean, and how they rank
with each other. This reconsidering is in tension with the rule of
law. On the one hand, reconsideration always holds out the
possibility of a more or less radical break from the past. On the
other hand, the rule of law can inform the reconsidering so that the
reconsidering would not be truly a starting-from-scratch; rather,
past decisions would be both the starting point and the object of the
reconsideration.
Given these two heterogeneous functions of appellate courts,
i.e., to promote the intelligibility of trial court decisions and to
reconsider doctrinal problems, we might expect that the
presumptive weight given to stabilizing norms and past decisions
will be looser at the appellate level. We might, that is, expect the
commitment to the rule of law to be weaker. And, indeed, that is
the case. On the other hand, departures in appellate decisions from
conventions and past decisions will, to that extent, undermine the
intelligibility of those decisions and thus require public explanation
to compensate. And, indeed, the almost universal use of written
opinions by appellate courts serves this need.
III. CONCLUSION
Read one way, the preceding argument is about autonomous
choice and decision. An individual chooses to be a certain kind of
person. That choice, in turn, implicates a particular constellation
and ordering of values, and the individual expresses those values
and, thereby, who he or she is by choosing to act in particular
ways. By extension, members of a polity define themselves as a
2005]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
political community by choosing to act in certain ways, thereby
expressing a particular constellation and ordering of values. And
this is true both for private citizens and for officials, like judges,
who express what the community stands for through their
decisions. In this reading, I am describing the rule of law as an
instrument for the community's self-actualization. Through the
rule of law, the community projects an ongoing, coherent account
of its defining values and an ongoing, coherent charting of change
in those values.
Such a reading is consistent with that road of postmodernism
that leads to existentialism. Thus, a brief word about
postmodemism is in order. Postmodernism challenges the reality
of stable foundations for meaning in both the interpretive sense,
i.e., what a text or an event "means" is indeterminate, and the
existential sense, i.e., what my life "means" is indeterminate.
75
Meaning, then, must be determined by choice. I define myself and
give meaning to my life by the choices I make. The same holds
true for communities.
However, postmodemism is ambivalent with respect to the
very idea of choice. For the autonomy that meaning-making
choice seems to entail is at odds with another important
postmodern tenet: our situatedness. By this light, each of us is the
product of many intersecting forces, and we cannot achieve the
existential distance from our situation needed to make autonomous
choices. Hence, our sense of ourselves as individuals with an
aspect of being that is independent of the world in which we are
situated is an illusion. Our choices, accordingly, are not "our
own," but are the product of preferences, which are themselves
constructed by these same forces that construct us as individuals.
We cannot, therefore, be self-defining.
A safe perspective on all this would seem to be the following:
We cannot know whether we are free or not. Our individual sense
of ourselves, as in some crucial respect standing apart from and
independent of our world, may or may not be illusory, but we
75. "That postmodernism is indefinable is a truism. However, it can be
described as a. set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing
concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and
hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity, historical
progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning." Gary Aylesworth,
"Postmodernism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/postmodemism (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). See also
Douglas E. Litowitz, Postmodern Philosophy and Law 140-141 (1997)
(discussing Richard Rorty's ideas about the contingency of "language, selfhood,
and community").
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cannot achieve the epistemological distance from ourselves to
answer that question. We simply cannot know.
Given that practical fact, we need a different reading of my
argument, one that is no longer about autonomous choice and
decision, but rather about the phenomenon of self-identity. More
specifically, my argument can be read as a prediction that
individuals will tend to experience themselves as having coherent
identities, identities that include commitments to various values
and to identifiable rankings among those values. Accordingly, as
individuals we tend to "choose" actions that express those values
and rankings. Whether those choices are free or constructed or
something in between is unknowable and beside the point.
Similarly, we can predict that communities tend to experience
themselves as having more or less coherent identities. To the
extent that they do, those identities include commitments to
various values and to identifiable rankings among those values,
and the communities through private and official actions will tend
to "choose" actions that express those values and rankings.
In this reading, the identities in question are not fixed.
Coherence does not preclude development and change, but the
change will tend to be incremental and connected to the past. Even
when a significant change in identity occurs, as when, for example,
an individual with left-wing commitments as a youth becomes a
politically conservative adult, this reconsideration of what one
stands for will often be perceived as continuous with one's past,
rather than as a radical break.
For communities, then, the value of the rule of law will lie in
its usefulness as a tool for connecting to the community's past an
important class of public actions that express the community's
values and, thus, its identity, namely, legal actions, i.e., the class of
actions that implicates the community's coercive power.
Various political justifications have been offered for the rule of
law, such as Lockean liberalism, European rationalism, and
American egalitarianism. These are, of course, culturally specific,
reflecting peculiarly Anglo-European history and values. The
argument I am advancing here is, I think, less parochial, for I
suspect that, like protection against tyranny, self-definition turns
out to be important universally for communities. Our ability to
cope with the world requires that we continually make judgments
about what is important, that is to say, that we continually make
value judgments. And it may well be that we can make such
judgments more efficiently and effectively if we have some sense
of who we are and what we stand for, not in a fixed, unalterable
sense, but to the degree necessary to have a clear starting point for
our deliberations about the problems we encounter in the world.
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Of course, the rule of law is not necessary for a community's
identity. Perhaps a culturally homogeneous community can say
who it is without law. In such societies, custom might suffice to
express what the community stands for.
But as a practical matter few, if any, communities are
homogeneous. Accordingly, the argument made in this part might
explain the trans-cultural appeal of the rule of law that seems
sooner or later to insinuate its way into democratic, theocratic, and
totalitarian societies alike. For in societies comprising different
populations whose members embrace a multitude of heterogeneous
and often irreconcilable values, one powerful way that the polity
can say what it is through the public resolution of disputes by
means of an ongoing series of choices among these different
values. However, to serve that function, the choices must be
intelligible. If every legal decision were explained and justified,
civic business would grind to a halt. In large part, therefore, we
depend for the intelligibility of legal decisions on conventions,
which are the stabilizing norms, and past decisions, whose
meaning and authority for the present are established by those
norms. In other words, we depend, in large part, on the rule of
law.
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